How to Argue about Health Care by Herzog, Don
11
How to Argue about
Health Care
Don Herzog, Ph.D.*
*Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, College of Literature, Science,
and the Arts, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 
Despite the aggressive title of this article, my goals are
modest. I begin by explaining briefly what should at any rate be obvious:
that health care policies inescapably raise moral and political difficulties,
difficulties that no technical fix could resolve. I move on to puzzle over
the connections between some of the more abstract issues of moral and
political theory and medical policy: here I urge that we develop a more
sustained taste for exploring the moral conflicts embedded in our current
practices. Finally, I suggest a strategy for making nitty-gritty facts-from
the concrete world of third-party payment, expensive technology, and the
rest-do theoretically innovative work for us, and use that strategy to
sketch an argument against the market model of health care provision.
COULD MEDICAL POLICY’
EVER BE PURELY TECHNICAL?
That issues of medical care seem at least to raise profound moral and
political questions is undeniable. Is it fair-the fact is undeniable, even
if the metrics are controversial-that rich people get better medical care
than poor people? Is abortion justifiable? And if it is, should Medicaid
fund abortions for the poor on demand? Should we sink more money
than we do into mundane preventive care, or concentrate our resources
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on spectacular efforts to save people with highly visible and moving
problems? If adding 16 cents to the price of a pack of cigarettes would
induce 3.5 million people to stop smoking, thus preventing 850,000 early
deaths (Harvard University 1985), should the government slap on some
more tax? Should the medical market, or what there is left of one, be left
to its own devices? Or is there a case for piecemeal or systematic govern-
’ ment intervention? Should cancer victims be allowed to purchase Laetrile?
If Dr. Nagel finds himself at the scene of an accident, able to save either
20-year-old affable Jim or 60-year-old brilliant Sarah, but not both, what
should he do? And how should we react when we notice that, thanks to
scarcity, our policy decisions inevitably present the same issues of triage?
However undeniable it seems to many of us that these questions are
inescapably moral and political, some are inclined to cast them as tech-
nical dilemmas. (By technical dilemma, I mean a question of what means
best realizes a given end.) Abusively branding such people technocrats
will not make them disappear. Nor for that matter will anything else: the
technocrats we will have with us always. But it is worth reiterating the
arguments against the availability of any technical fix, and it is helpful
to notice why so many find technical fixes alluring. Let me consider four
approaches to technical fixes: economic analysis, utilitarianism, scientific
authority, and piecemeal social engineering.
If we are wondering how to allocate federal money, or for that matter
if we run a private hospital and are wondering what our budget should
look like, anyone reasonably conversant with introductory economics may
suggest that we shift our funds until we have equalized the value of the
marginal dollar spent in each arena. The proposal seems the quintessence
of rationality, until we ask what counts as value, and how we are to
measure it. If we need to know whether we should alleviate the suffering
of a terminal cancer patient or spend the same money on increasing the
survival odds of a badly deformed infant, the economists advice is sin-
gularly unhelpful. We still need a standard of value, and as soon as some-
one suggests that the infants survival is more important, we are back at
square one, with a nontechnical question.
Utilitarianism might be thought helpful. A utilitarian, after all, has
a substantive account of value: we should maximize happiness across the
population. (Here I ignore the surprising variety of ways of unpacking
that principle: Is it mean or total happiness? Does the relevant population
include fetuses, or nonhuman animals? Is happiness a pleasurable mental
state or preference satisfaction? Which should maximize happiness-our
rules and social practices, or each and every act? That there is such a
surprising variety suggests that even debates among utilitarians them-
- selves cannot be purely technical.) The utilitarian standard, if accepted,
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would transform not just questions of health policy, but all political ques-
tions, into technical ones. In every case we should simply choose whatever
alternative maximizes happiness. And we can readily imagine a bright
young army of bureaucratic happiness consultants, trained in our nations
public policy institutes to perform the relevant calculations.
, But we have no good reason to adopt utilitarianism. (See Herzog
1985, chapter 3, for discussion of the putative justifications for utilitar-
ianism.) Many other decision rules could transform moral and political
questions into technical ones. For instance, we could do whatever was
proposed first, or we could throw dice to choose the winning policy. And
despite its unmistakable historical prestige, utilitarianism has been given
no better justification than either of those zany possibilities.
At the same time, utilitarianism is notoriously inept at handling
issues of life and death, the very issues central to health policy. Offhand
it seems as though someone out to maximize total happiness should insist
on a population explosion, at least until the marginal birth led to a de-
crease in total expected happiness thanks to overcrowding. And it seems
as though someone out to maximize average happiness should want to
play ten little Indians, systematically bumping off the least happy indi-
viduals in the population. Finally, it seems that a utilitarian should think
that a painless death, or a death that would not change the greatest hap-
piness score, is morally indifferent. More important, utilitarians simply
misunderstand the particular agonies of health policy decisions. Our wor-
ries about what to do with a suffering parent are hardly exhausted by
questions about happiness; they are so poignant because of our consid-
erable regard for autonomy, for trying to be responsive to the freedom
and self-respect of that bedridden individual. It is not just that the patient
suffers; it is that the patient is helpless. In fact, we now care about much
else besides maximizing happiness; utilitarians have given us no good
reason to drop our other concerns.
Yet another approach to finding a technical fix is provided by the
appeal to scientific authority. The world of medicine-I insist on the
significance of this point later-is for most of us a mysterious world,
where briskly self-assured experts dispose of our fates without bothering
to sketch rationales, or by sketching rationales we are simply incapable
of following in any depth. No doubt such authority is readily exploited:
we all have- seen the callous doctor who speaks in polysyllables simply
to fend off anxious patients and their demanding relatives. Still, this is
a context where some authority is here to stay, and for good reason. We
do not all go to medical school, or read up on advanced microbiology in
our spare time, and so it makes sense for us to defer to medical experts.
Some then will want to expand the bounds of medical expertise, to
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suggest that doctors have special insight into what strike the rest of us
as moral and political dilemmas. Doctors themselves are often ready to
assure us that they should be left to decide whether a baby with spina
bifida should be kept alive. Ronald Reagan has made a similar move in
urging that scientists have shown that the fetus is a person, and so abor-
tion is wrong. But medical expertise cannot go this far. Being better ac-
quainted with the facts of the matter can make doctors more discerning
judges, but when they decide what to do with a badly deformed baby,
or whether a fetus is a person, their medical expertise does not do the
job. Spina bifida and abortion both raise questions about the boundaries
of the concept of personhood, about how beings not obviously qualifying
as persons ought to be treated. And personhood is a moral, political, and
legal concept, not a scientific one. To call some being a person is to say
it is entitled to certain sorts of respect. Once we decide what criteria are
relevant to qualifying as a person, scientists can help establish whether
some being meets the criteria, but they cannot claim to have expertise
on the right criteria. To succumb to scientific authority here is to be
mystified-or, perhaps, devious.
One last way of seeking a technical fix here is provided by some
versions of piecemeal social engineering, or incrementalism. Suppose we
eschew all attempts to hammer out moral and political principles to il-
luminate health policy. Suppose instead we note that there are certain
pressing problems that demand solutions. Medicaid leaves many or most
poor people uncovered; the unemployed can lose their health insurance
benefits and not qualify for any replacement; water tables in some areas
are increasingly toxic. Given such problems, one might think only a phil-
osophical skeptic could doubt that we need to do something. We need
to frame the most effective solutions we can. And, the incrementalist will
add, surely we can talk about problems and solutions without bothering
with lofty or metaphysical talk about justice, or desert, or property rights.
I am myself fond of the problem-solution framework. But nothing
is gained, and much is lost, by trying to purge all moral and political
dimensions from our descriptions of problems and solutions. That one
can be poor and not have even rudimentary health care in this country
is a problem partly because it so greatly disadvantages the poor, because
it seems unfair, and so on. That water tables are toxic is a problem partly
because the individuals affected are not responsible for the toxicity, be-
cause they are the unwilling victims of corporate decisions, and so on.
Solutions, meanwhile, are not only more or less effective. They are more
or less just, more or less intrusive on liberty, and so on. We could, I
suppose, learn to purge any &dquo;offensive’ moral and political concepts from
our accounts of problems and solutions, but why should we? Doing so
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would impoverish our understanding of the world. Just as the utilitarian
gives us no good reason to stop caring about things besides the greatest
happiness, so the technocratic incrementalist gives us no good reason to
limit our accounts of problems and solutions.
It is also worth noting that many too readily applaud the genius of
, incrementalism as a rational way to make policy. You do not have to be
Edmund Burke to be skeptical of our ability to remake the social and
political world from scratch in any intelligent way. Piecemeal social en-
gineering thus becomes instantly attractive: if we fiddle at the margins
instead of redesigning everything at once, we can tell which measures
improve things and which worsen them. We can also compromise on
hotly fought issues. The rejoinders should be obvious. First, how rational
could piecemeal social engineering be when we tinker with everything
at once in a constantly shifting environment? What hope is there for
estimating with any shred of reliability what is helping and what is
hurting? Second, piecemeal social engineering constantly gives rise to
blatantly irrational policy gaps. There is no good rationale for extending
federal largesse to those needing renal dialysis but withholding it from
those needing other expensive and ongoing therapies. Instead, Congress,
moved by a parade of needy witnesses, happened to plug that particular
gap. Third, compromise may often give us the worst of both worlds; or,
to put it another way, compromise may be the art of making everyone
unhappy.
So where do we stand? It is not just that health policy seems to
present moral and political dilemmas, rather than only technical ones. It
really does present such dilemmas. We could, if we liked, refuse to pay
attention to them. We could steep ourselves in economic analysis or util-
itarianism ; we could defer to the decisions of scientists or bureaucrats.
Doing so, though, would be a bit of bad faith or self-deception, a sign
not just of psychological evasion but of political irresponsibility. Given
the pressing place moral and political questions have in our lives, evading
them shortchanges others as well as ourselves.
Why then is the evasion so tempting? Why have so very many, in
such very different ways, sought to find technical fixes to policy prob-
lems ? A full answer would be extraordinarily complex, but two points
are worth noting. We want democratic debate to be as full an airing as
possible of our problems and tentative solutions. Democracy, I would
suggest, is justifiable not because of any alleged right of the majority to
rule, but because of the central emphasis it places on debate and delib-
eration. If democracy is government by discussion, it should be a more
rational political system. Now, there are contexts in which democratic
debate should not be utterly full and public: foreign policy is a classic
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example. And perhaps sometimes issues should be underplayed because
they lend themselves to strident and explosive rhetoric, and we want to
keep ongoing debates in other areas moving along productively. This
justification is more problematic, and lends itself all too readily to serving
as a pretext for a decidedly uglier cause: sometimes debate will be cur-
tailed lest it serve the interests of the less powerful. 
’
~ 
Some of our desire to transform questions of health policy into tech-
nical issues arises in just this way. Many suspect that the best arguments
we can articulate point toward making the American health care delivery
system a good deal more egalitarian than it now is. If that is so, doctors
may fear losing six-figure incomes, and the middle classes may fear in-
creased taxation. Egalitarianism need not mean either of those things:
we would need to hear more than the mere mention of equality to know
what is at stake. But from a narrowly self-interested point of view, dem-
ocratic debate may seem threatening.
It would however be wrong, not just uncharitable, to suggest that
everyone who does not want to explore the moral and political issues
lurking in health policy must be an unprincipled scoundrel out to protect
his or her own interests. The tenor and substance of todays public rhetoric
plays a role. We have learned to celebrate individual initiative-the free
individual who makes his or her own way, asking no favors and earning
his or her keep. We have learned too to celebrate markets as social mech-
anisms that generate optimal allocations given reigning preferences and
holdings. Worries about social institutions and justice simply do not fit
comfortably into that public rhetoric. (To which one might add, so much
the worse for todays public rhetoric.) To recur to the means-end distinc-
tion, we have become acutely conscious, thanks partly to our fabled bud-
get deficits, that we have a scarcity of resources for realizing our ends.
Yet, not only our means are scarce. The more serious, if less often noticed,
scarcity relevant to policy concerns is a scarcity of agreement on ends.
We simply disagree, in pointed and protracted ways, about what we
ought to be striving for.
SOME COMPETING STRATEGIES
IN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
Once we surrender all hopes of turning health policy into a technical
field, we need to find a way of arguing about what we ought to be
striving for. It might seem sensible first to hammer out a general theory
of justice and then apply it to the case. I want to suggest that that strategy
is misguided; here I briefly examine the recent powerful theories of John
Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Michael Walzer.
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We can start by noting that we do not begin with a moral blank
slate. Some may be clear and firm, others murkier and more conditional,
but we already hold views about these issues. We may believe for instance
that no human being should be without a &dquo;decent minimum&dquo; of health
care, or that the government should restrict itself to informing us of the
risks of cigarette smoking, but not paternalistically try to prevent us from
smoking. Moral and political theorists sometimes call such views our
moral intuitions, without thereby committing themselves to any belief
that they are observational reports on some realm of moral facts (Prichard
1971; Ross 1973). It is, putting it mildly, difficult to imagine what sort of
creatures moral facts might be. (See Mackie 1977, chapter 1, for a critique.)
What role should those intuitions play in our arguments? To strat-
egies have struck many as attractive, but I want to reject both of them.
The first is to say that our intuitions must be ultimately decisive; they
are, one might think, all we have. Such a view may motivate Judith Jarvis
Thomsons intriguing defense of abortion (Thomson 1971). Thomson pro-
duces clever analogies to illuminate the abortion puzzle. She asks, for
instance, what one should do if a superb violinist were kidnapped by the
Society of Music Lovers and strapped into some hospital apparatus to be
kept alive, and suggests that if one is allowed to pull the plug and get
up, women have no obligation to keep their fetuses alive. But in the end
it is the force of our intuitions that does the argumentative work. The
second strategy is to reject our intuitions, to insist that we learn to get
along without them; they are, one might think, nothing but the product
of our upbringing, so we have no reason to take them as particularly
rational or defensible. Such a view clearly motivates R. M. Hares ethical
theory, and leads him to complain that Thomson &dquo;simply parades [her]
examples before us and asks what we would say about them&dquo; (Hare 1975).
Hare wants the bare logic of the moral concepts to be the grounds of
moral and political theory.
It would be foolish to claim that we have to eiflter draw on our
moral intuitions or try to build a systematic theory. We can try to work
up our intuitions into a systematic theory, and in a very abstract way we
can take that as a description of what Rawls, Nozick, and Walzer are up
to, for all the otherwise interesting differences in their accounts. Let me
offer a summary sketch of each theorists views.
Rawls wants to arrive at principles of justice for regulating what he
calls the basic structure of society, or those social institutions that play
an important role in allocating life chances (Rawls 1971). His justificatory
strategy for defending his principles is complex: he wants to claim that
rational agents in a fair position would choose them, that they match our
considered judgments and extend them in an acceptable way, and that
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they could serve as a shared public understanding in a stable society.
These three criteria all condition each other: we may juggle the description
of the fair position to accommodate our intuitions about acceptable prin-
ciples, for instance, or we may alter our account of what principles could
serve as a shared public understanding once we see the derivation of
those principles from the fair position. Critics have seen here an illicit
attempt to run together competing arguments, and so have suggested that
Rawls is simply rigging his theory of justice (Wolff 1977, chapter 16).
Rawls9 response, I take it, would be that political theory is all about
revising judgments in different realms to make them more coherent. &dquo;Jus-
tification,&dquo; as he puts it, &dquo;is a matter of the mutual support of many
considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view&dquo;
(Rawls 1971, p. 579).
What principles emerge from this complex theoretical strategy?
Briefly, Rawls defends two principles of justice. The first, which has prior-
ity over the second, says that: &dquo;Each person is to have an equal right to
the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with
a similar system of liberty for all.&dquo; The second says that: &dquo;Social and
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings
principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity&dquo; (Rawls 1971, p. 302).
Offering any full account of the meaning of these principles would
carry us well into the intricacies of Rawls§ theory. Here we can ask this:
What implications do these principles have for matters of health policy?
Since Rawls wants principles of justice for the basic structure of society,
it would be a mistake to seek in his views any guidance for what Norman
Daniels calls micro questions of health policy, questions on what indi-
vidual actors should do in problematic settings. But, as Daniels notes in
his thoughtful attempt to extend Rawls, it is surprisingly unclear what
the upshot of Rawls§ theory is even for macro questions of health policy
(Daniels 1985, pp. 42-48; Daniels makes an especially interesting claim
about the formalism of Rawls§ theory in note 2, p. 44). Probably the best
bet is to exploit Rawls§ connecting the priority of liberty with self-respect,
and argue that health care plays a crucial role in assuring the self-respect
of individuals. This would entitle all citizens to equal health care, or
perhaps a decent minimum; certainly it seems in the spirit of Rawls~
theory to think that health care is not the sort of thing that should be left
to the vagaries of the market. It would, however, take a systematic exten-
sion of the theory to make it speak to questions of health policy.
None of this need be taken as criticism of Rawls. Quite the contrary:
if justification is a matter of continually trying to make our views more
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coherent, Rawls can agree that his theory needs elaboration in these do-
mains, as indeed he has (Rawls 1982). But it does mean that it ivould be
a mistake to come to Rawls seeking ready solutions for the dilemmas of
health policy. As it stands now, his theory speaks far more articulately
to economic inequality than it does to health policy.
, Nozicks (1974) theory, however, does seem to offer more dispositive
advice on health care. (Charles Fried [1975, 1976] has offered some No-
zickian analyses of health care,issues, a subject on which Nozick is rather
quiet-though see pp. 233-35. Still, Fried9 inarticulate support of a so-
cially guaranteed &dquo;decent minimum&dquo; is more than Nozick could grant.)
Nozick insists on the primacy of property rights. If, he claims, one has
attained what one owns by voluntary transactions, then one acts within
ones rights in doing with it whatever one sees fit, as long as one harms
no one else. The state acts legitimately only when protecting each indi-
viduals rights. If the state moves past protecting individuals from being
harmed by others and it decides to redistribute property in order to make
the lives of the poor more dignified, then, insists Nozick, the state tres-
passes on our rights and acts illegitimately. It might be nice for rich people
to choose to support poor people, but we may not use the armed might
of the state to compel them to do it. The import of this view for health
care is clear enough: if you want to buy health care and you can afford
it, you are free to do so. But no one has any claim on providers or rich
people to force them to provide care for the poor. Our most minimal
government programs for supporting health care would thus, in Nozick
view, be illegitimate. Nozick would surely want to add that so, too, would
be the AMA§ legislatively created monopoly and all the concomitant med-
dling in the market, and I assume that he would be sympathetic to Milton
Friedmans suggestion that it is such interventionist legislation that drives
up the cost of health care in the first place (Friedman 1962, pp. 149-60).
Here is guidance, to be sure, but it all hangs on the primacy of
property rights. On that subject, Nozick has remarkably little to say. He
has an easy time reminding us that we think people generally should be
left alone to do what they like with what is theirs; powerful strands of
our moral intuitions support the claim. And he develops a marvelous
battery of arguments against any more interventionist state. But to cast
the social welfare state as illegitimate, Nozick needs more than that re-
minder, more than his objections. His own view faces a pressing objection
he is oddly silent about: he needs to assemble a case that property rights
are so important that they outweigh the value of human life, if the two
conflict. Yet he offers only cursory comments (Nozick 1974, pp. 30-35;
1981, pp. 498-504) on why we should take property rights so seriously
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and he, himself, acknowledges that his case for property rights is sketchy.
(See Nagel [1981] for a heated critique of Nozick on these issues.)
Reading Nozick often elicits the intuition that health care just does
not feel like another commodity to be bought and sold on the market, on
a par with ballpoint pens or cruises through the Mediterranean. This
,intuition shows up in rueful comments from practitioners: &dquo;As one pres-
ident of a county medical society said at an AMA meeting soon after
Reagan took office, ’Our mentor has always been Hippocrates, not Adam
Smith’ 
&dquo; 
(Starr 1982, p. 419). We can take the relevant portion of Walzer
(1983) theory of justice as an attempt to work up this view in a theoret-
ically sophisticated way. Walzer is skeptical of the attempt to work out
general principles of justice. If we want to know how some social good
ought to be allocated, he would urge, we need to interpret the reigning
social meaning of that good. It will turn out that different goods ought
to be allocated in different ways for different reasons.
Some goods, Walzer argues, have meanings that place their rightful
distribution prior to the market. Human beings, votes, criminal justice,
the Pulitzer prize, love and friendship, and more: these things, given our
understanding of them, ought never be bought or sold. There is obviously
no proscription in our society on buying and selling medical care, Walzer
agrees. But the meaning of medical care, for us, is that it should go to
those who need it. And once we see the implications of that principle of
need, Walzer urges, we will &dquo;see no reason to respect the doctors market
freedom. Needed goods are not commodities&dquo; (Walzer 1983, p. 90). It is
simply up to us, in democratic politics, to decide how much health care
should be left to the market.
’ 
What guidance do we find here? Walzer is concerned by the oddly
abstract quality of theories like that of Rawls. &dquo;My argument is radically
particularist. I don’t claim to have achieved any great distance from the
social world in which I live&dquo; (Walzer 1983, p. xiv). Yet that particularism
does not issue, indeed could not issue, some detailed legislative agenda
in the form of a concrete blueprint. Our understanding of health care
makes us uncomfortable with allocating it solely on the market. But when
we think of health care, we obviously do not think of specific amend-
ments to Medicare or Medicaid, and we do not instantly know whether
we should more generously fund routine preventive care for the elderly.
Those are the issues of which democratic debate is made. Walzer can
remind us of the relevant general considerations that play into the debate,
but speaking as an interpreter of our social world he can hardly pretend
to have found the detailed agenda we have already implicitly adopted.
There is no such agenda.
We are left with a discomfiting result. Nozick9 theory does seem
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to offer guidance, but we have no good reasons to adopt the theory. And
however sympathetic we are with Rawls or Walzer, it is not obvious what
the implications of their views are. It is a mistake to come to general
theories of justice, even ones as &dquo;particularist&dquo; as Walzers, seeking spe-
cific guidance on policy issues. The policy-minded will then wonder what
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the point is of general theories of justice, especially if they attempt to
articulate what an ideally just society is. We do not live in an ideally just
society, and we are not going to live in one soon. And it would be too
easy to say that ideal justice guides us by telling us what we should move
toward. A libertarian might think an ideally just society would have nei-
ther social welfare nor interventionist regulation, but would refuse to
support the abolition of social welfare now. Even though that would ap-
parently be a step toward justice, he or she might think, existing inter-
ventionist legislation creates rampant unemployment and suffering that
welfare programs ameliorate. The conclusion might be that we are better
off with both than with only one. Such considerations of offsetting prob-
lems make ideal justice a problematic guide.
Having two separate literatures, one on justice and one on health
care, is not going to help anyone. We need to learn to think theoretically
about more concrete issues of health policy, &dquo;to develop better philo-
sophical equipment to address questions in a nonideal world not always
bent on basic reform&dquo; (Daniels 1985, p. 229; Daniels notes, &dquo;that effort
was not my intention here&dquo;). For the remainder of this article, I shall try
to sketch what such equipment might look like.
LEARNING TO RELISH
MORAL CONFLICTS
Return for a moment to our moral intuitions. It is complacent to
enshrine them as they stand; we need a way to criticize them. Escaping
them completely, though, has proved decidedly unpromising. We need
a way of drawing on them that makes it possible to question and revise
them. How can we do that? In this section, I explain what one can do
with moral conflicts; in the next, I turn to exploiting descriptive
considerations.
Political theorists who set out to support some view by appealing
to our intuitions will almost always have an easy time of it. Unless their
views are unbelievably eccentric, our moral consciousness will have the
resources they need. For, like it or not, our moral consciousness is re-
markably capacious: we hold an embarrassing wealth of moral and po-
litical judgments and can easily see both sides of many, many issues. So
one political theorist setting out to make a case for treating medicine as
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a commodity, to be bought and sold on the market, can remind us of our
commitments to free choice and private property. He or she can forge
those commitments into some imposing general principle, and then use
that principle to attack antimarket views. At the same time, another po-
litical theorist setting out to make a case against treating medicine as a
commodity can remind us of our commitments to satisfying need and
supplying everyone with at least a &dquo;decent minimum&dquo;. He or she can
forge those commitments into an equally imposing but quite different
general principle, and then use that principle to attack market views. Both
arguments will seem striking; neither could be ultimately persuasive.
The same point could be made about reading our culture, or turning
to the time-honored verities of American political thought. Our culture
and our history are themselves profoundly ambiguous and ambivalent
on all sorts of moral and political questions. So consider two accounts of
what constitutes America§ vaunted liberalism.
The first account: America was founded with a strong commitment
to the essentials of John Lockes liberalism-private property, a state lim-
ited to protecting individual rights, religious toleration, and so on. States
being the greedy creatures they are, though, American government began
slowly but surely to grow, a growth that took off like some malignant
cancer with the New Deal. The social welfare state is a renunciation of
our liberal heritage, a step down Hayek’s road to serfdom. Or it is simply
a con game. In a brilliant indictment of the American welfare state-
written in 1883!-William Graham Sumner played an individualistic dis-
solving game with the rhetoric of welfare. What really goes on in social
welfare programs, he claimed, is that A and B force C to give money to
D. And who could say they had the right to force C along? Some who
continue to hold to Lockean politics bitterly claim that the &dquo;liberals&dquo; of
twentieth-century America simply stole the label, since it was so
prestigious.
The second account: Liberalism has always been premised on a
concern for the security and welfare of ordinary men and women. Lib-
erals defended the limited state and private property when the major
threats to ordinary people were absolutist rulers, tax farming, onerous
apprenticeships, and the like. Once those threats faded, liberals properly
turned their attention to new problems. Many decided that the market,
once the promise of ordinary people, had become a new locus of uncon-
trolled power that left many helpless. The American welfare state, then,
was not the renunciation of liberalism; it was its continued pursuit. So
Edward Bellamy, defending socialism in the name of traditional American
values, insisted that he represented &dquo;the true conservative party&dquo;, fighting
against the new and insidious &dquo;money power&dquo;. Democratic socialism, in
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this view, is as American as apple pie. And it is no accident that as great
a liberal as John Stuart Mill was also a democrat, a feminist, and at least
deeply sympathetic with socialism.
Whether we turn to our intuitions or our traditions, then, we can
make almost any proposal look good. To give one last example, from the
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recent debate about justice: It is too easy to make claims of desert and.
talent evaporate with a quick reference to the arbitrariness of the natural
lottery, and it is too easy to mock claims of need by reminding us of
property rights. So the procedure of forging ones favorite intuitions into
a general principle, and then either ignoring other intuitions or assaulting
them with the principle, is manifestly unsatisfactory. The same game can
always be played by ones opponents. Much of the literature of contem-
porary political theory and public policy, I suggest, is flawed by a failure
to recognize just how ambivalent and pliable our intuitions and history
are.
We need to begin by focusing our attention on moral conflicts, in-
stead of ignoring them or doing short shrift to either side of them. Fo-
cusing on such conflicts, thinking about why we have commitments to
both sides and how we might plausibly transcend or resolve the conflicts
would allow us to use our intuitions without enshrining them as sacro-
sanct. Consider a sampling-the list is anything but exhaustive-of con-
flicts arising in health policy. In every one of these cases, we do in fact
have strong and contradictory commitments.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The scientific community thrives on a principle of free inquiry. Re-
searchers, we think, should be allowed to do what they want to do. ,
Granting them that freedom ensures the continued progress of science,
and it is quite easy to summon up visions of Lysenkoism as the alter-
native. But we do not want science-happy doctors to play with whatever
fancy new technology they can get their hands on. We do not want pa-
tients to be used as guinea pigs. And we worry that the uncontrolled
deployment of new technology will send medical costs skyrocketing, and
take away funds that could be used less dramatically but more effectively
elsewhere.
ATTENTION GETTERS AND THE ANONYMOUS
The local news media find some wonderfully needy case-a freckle-
faced eight-year-old needing massive transfusions and organ transplants
after an accident-and make it a public cause. Donations flood in. Many
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other equally needy cases go unrewarded, because they happened not to
be broadcast into thousands of homes. It is morally commendable to
respond to people in need. But it is unfair to give disproportionate ben-
efits to some because they happen to be better known.
THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE
Human life, we think, is priceless: In Kants famous words, the
dignity of man is of absolute worth, unlike any mere market value. Kants
transcendentalism aside, we have good historical reasons for insisting on
this claim. We have rejected various social schemes-ancient criminal
codes, slavery, mandatory dowries-that put an explicit price on human
life. And we rightly take our rejection as notable progress. Yet social
scientists and budget directors tell us ever more about the value of human
life. We know that if we spend x dollars more per year on highway safety,
y fewer people will die. We know to a niggling degree of precision just
what it costs to keep a terminal patient alive with heroic therapies for
another week. In fact, despite our aversions to facing the fact, human life
does have a price. But how can we decide what price is worth paying?
MEDICAL AUTONOMY AND MEDICAL NEED
Part of the freedom of modem individuals is occupational choice:
People, we think, should be allowed to choose their careers, not inherit
them or be assigned to them. They should be allowed to decide for whom
they will work and for whom they will not. But giving doctors such
market freedom may mean leaving the needy drastically underserved.
And the needy are just that: people in need of medical care. Such dramatic
needs, we also think, ought to be satisfied. Once again, it would be too
easy either to brand national health service as slavery, or to say with
Walzer that we see no reason to respect the doctor’s market freedom. We
see reasons to respect it attd reasons not to.
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND CONSUMER CHOICE
Health care seems not to be an ordinary commodity; many are
tempted by some principle of equality of opportunity to account for its
proper distribution. But how much of its distribution? Should the rich
be entitled to purchase cosmetic plastic surgery? Or face-lifts? Or should
such medical care be placed outside the realm of the market? The more
scope we assign to equality here, the more we limit consumer choice.
And we do value consumer choice. Adding a time dimension only ag-
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gravates the dilemma. If it is true here too that market freedom tends to
promote innovation and progress, todays market medicine may provide
tomorrows therapy for all. If there is a conflict between the interests of
the present poor and the future poor, how should it be resolved? (I owe
the core form of this puzzle to Amy Gutmann [1983].)
PATIENT AUTONOMY AND PATERNALISM
Patients are human beings like the rest of us. They want to know
what their prognosis is, what the risks of the relevant procedures are,
even and notoriously whether they will ever play the piano again. We
recognize their autonomy partly by giving them answers to these ques-
tions. Yet there are better reasons than the convenience of doctors not to
answer these questions all the time. We may think that leaving a patient
in blissful ignorance will increase his or her chances of recovery. Here is
a case for treating patients paternalistically. Like other such cases, it is
one we recognize reluctantly.
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND SURVEILLANCE
In a world of electronic data banks, we insist on privacy as a crucial
individual right. People should be left alone to pursue their own plans
as they see fit, without worrying about snoopy state functionaries bug-
ging them. Yet in the name of protecting individual rights-the rights of
deformed infants-the Reagan administration established alarmingly in-
trusive procedures, complete with a 24-hour hot line to let anonymous
tipsters turn in doctors who were assisting parents in making heartbreak-
ing decisions. The Reagan scheme might be defended as the only plausible
way to prevent genteel, antiseptic murder.
FREEDOM OF CHOICE AND LIFE
We are committed to’both life and free choice: Life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness is the canonical phrase for Americans. But life and
liberty may conflict. If a lucid 60-year-old drafts a living will saying he
or she would like euthanasia if Alzheimers disease or some other mentally
disabling disorder develops, should we respect that will? (It hardly helps
to suggest that we ask the person after the disease has been contracted
whether he or she still wants to be so bound. The persons later self, unlike
the earlier self, is incompetent-and that is just what the person feared.)
The law is ambivalent on the question, and so are we. Only the doctri-




Built into tort law and everyday notions of moral responsibility is
a focus on villains. If you have been harmed, you should be able to point
to the person or persons who did the harming. Crime with villains is
easy to see, so it is no wonder we have riveted our attention on it. Yet we
now know there may be crime without villains. Corporations in good
faith may dump what everyone thought were harmless chemicals, and
freakish chemical reactions may create toxic chemicals leading to birth
defects. Individuals may end up suffering without being able to show
who has harmed them. Workers suffering asbestosis know very well why
they have it, but if they worked in three different plants over 30 years
they will find it impossible to demonstrate which employer harmed them.
If we insist on individual responsibility, we do not compensate the suf-
fering. If we insist on compensating the suffering, we qualify individual
responsibility.
THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE
Liberal societies guarantee freedom of religion, partly by tying such
freedom to a separation of church and state. Science is another separate
institution in liberal society. In the laboratory, no one should care what
your religion is; in church, your salvation should not depend on your
views on quantum mechanics. But such separations are never hard and
fast, and religion and science have been coming to blows in heated issues
of public policy. One such issue is relevant to health policy: When is a
person dead? The scientific community may be increasingly fond of brain
death, on the grounds that without a properly functioning central nervous
system there is nothing that we can recognize as a person. But the theo-
logically inclined may take this as another piece of secular blasphemy,
and insist that as long as a heart is beating the soul has not yet departed.
Which view should the state enforce? And why? Is it possible for the state
here to be &dquo;fair&dquo; or &dquo;evenhanded&dquo; or &dquo;neutral&dquo;?
FERTILE EGGS AND FUTURE SELVES
Suppose a scientist wants to experiment on fertile eggs and takes
extra eggs and sperm donated for other purposes to create the fertile eggs.
Suppose the point of the experiment is to find out more about the genetic
bases of various birth defects. That research would, if successful, pay off
in the welfare of the yet unborn. May we use fertile eggs this way? The
fuss raised in England over this question suggests that it is not an easy
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one. We are not sure what rights if any to ascribe to blastulas and the
like, nor are we sure what standing future generations have. And then
there is the additional issue of using some for the welfare of others. One
can arrive at an easy enough judgment here if one is so inclined. One
can say that fertile eggs are persons and persons can never be used. Or
one can say that fertile eggs are fertile eggs, open to any laboratory use
we like. Either answer involves ignoring some of our intuitions. The
puzzle is reminiscent of the much older debate on the defensibility of
vivisection, now heated up again with the animal rights campaign and
accusations of speciesism. Animals, fertile eggs, the badly deformed, and
the unborn: all challenge us to refine our rather inchoate picture of what
beings are entitled to what sort of moral regard.
STRATEGIES FOR HANDLING
CONFLICTS
If we begin by forcing ourselves to give these conflicts their due, we
can have more confidence in our arguments. We need not worry that we
have made things too easy on ourselves by discussing only those intui-
tions that lead us to our desired conclusion. Once the conflict is on the
table, we do not have to throw up our hands and confess that we are
morally and politically paralyzed. There may be such moral and political
dead ends, but there are also strategies for resolving conflicts. Consider
some schematic possibilities.
We might decide to demarcate the boundaries within which our
various commitments should apply. For instance, one plausible reaction
to the putative conflict between free scientific inquiry and untrammeled
deployment of new medical technology might be to articulate a line be-
tween basic and applied research. We might argue that scientists carrying
out basic research, in laboratories or teaching hospitals, should be left to
their own devices. But doctors, who are basically in the business of ser-
ving patients, must submit to institutional constraints justified in turn by
the goal of serving patients. Similarly, we might decide that while ordi-
narily we have good reasons to respect individual autonomy, helpless
patients fall into a different context in which paternalism may be justified.
These moves, of course, are only the bare beginnings of real arguments
and I do not mean to endorse them. I want only to show how demarcation
might work as one way of handling conflicts.
Instead of demarcating the scope of the principles, thus ensuring
there is no context in which they both apply, we might adopt some prior-
ity rule. Rawls5 principles of justice include a number of such rules: the
priority of liberty means that we may never sacrifice liberty for economic
advantage; the just savings principle means that we may never help to-
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days poor if it means systematically disadvantaging future generations.
Here we might say that individual responsibility is all well and good, but
not if it means that those who suffer through no fault of their own are
left uncompensated. So we might assign priority to rewarding the victims
of asbestosis and say that here individual responsibility must give way.
Our priority rules need not be lexical, as Rawls’s are; they need not say,
. 
that is, pay no attention to the second until you have satisfied the first.
And obviously there are plenty of structural possibilities for weighing
conflicting commitments.
Both these strategies assume that we retain a commitment to both
intuitions that create the conflict. There are also strategies for revising or
even scrapping one (or both!) intuitions that create the puzzle. I will
mention two ways of drawing on our intuitions without taking them as
ultimately decisive.
We might ask for a reason supporting some judgment. Asking tvhy
over and over again can make us sound like philosophical skeptics, or
stubborn five-year-olds---and the two have resemblances worth explor-
ing. But that hardly means that we should never ask why. It may turn
out that some judgments are stupendously difficult to support. For in-
stance, patrons of a theological conception of death may find it very hard
to mount a coherent argument for having the state enshrine their views
into law.
More intriguing is that we can use the history of our moral and
political intuitions as a critical tool. Understanding how we came to cling
to some judgments may transform a stubborn intuition into a more nu-
anced judgment, or it may even make us decide that the judgment no
longer applies. I began to sketch such an argument earlier when com-
menting on why we insist that human life is priceless. Once we see the
place that judgment had in rejecting institutions like chattel slavery, the
road is clear for us to explain what is different about deathbed settings.
Here, we might say, there is no issue of treating people as property. Here,
others might rejoin, there is all too pressing an issue of abusing some
people for the sake of others-weary family members, or overtaxed in-
surers. Moral and political intuitions have their homes, their explanatory
and justificatory homes, in certain social settings. Investigating those
settings can help us to criticize and revise the intuitions. Gary Hart has
alerted us to the need to beware the failed policies of the past. More
worrisome are the successful policies of the past, which may well have
outlived their usefulness. Our intuitions will lag dreamily on, endorsing
positions and practices which have become bankrupt. As a result, poli-
cymakers, like generals, may always be fighting the last war.
This last line of argument, I believe, could be enormously powerful
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in thinking about health care. It leads me to the second general strategy
I mentioned for criticizing intuitions: making facts criticize our values.
FACTS AGAINST VALUES:
. CRITICIZING THE MARKET MODEL
That facts might be able to criticize values is a puzzling notion.
Using the best philosophy of science now available, facts cannot even
serve as critical tests that descriptive theories must pass. How then can
they be used against avowedly evaluative views? I readily grant that a
factual proposition cannot logically contradict an evaluative one. That log-
ical point, though, settles nothing.
The fact-value gap has seemed alluring to many, and not just as a
logical schism. Social scientists routinely use it to explain why they do
not have to care about evaluative questions, while moral and political
theorists routinely use it to explain why they do not have to care about
factual questions. Both sides seem worse off when making that move,
especially when it comes to thinking about public policy. Policy positions
are always mixtures of &dquo;facts&dquo; and &dquo;values&dquo;, caught up together in a com-
plex web. It is a rare political proposition that is either purely factual (the
president of France is elected for a seven-year term) or purely evaluative
(Nixon is awful). Most are mixed (Stockman rudely assaulted the nation’s
farmers), and nothing would be gained for most purposes by trying to
sort them out into their logically separable factual and evaluative
components.
Policy analysts, implicitly or explicitly, summon up pictures of what
the world is like, both in criticizing other views and in advancing their
own. The plausibility and even intelligibility of their views depends partly
on the accuracy of those depictions. A simple example will help make the
point. Recall a common complaint about social welfare programs: by re-
ivarding people for being lazy, we encourage them to be lazy. Or, as
Auberon Herbert once put it, a country can have exactly as many paupers
as it chooses to pay for. This complaint is often tied to a similar view:
recipients of social welfare do not really need it; they could get a job and
support themselves, but they would rather loll around on the dole. If
someone is making this sort of complaint to argue against Medicaid, facts
can play an explosive role. He or she may be surprised to hear that most
poor people are children. That inconvenient fact makes it impossible to
go on voicing the common complaint about social welfare recipients.
Children have not chosen their parents, do not choose to be poor, and
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could not go out and earn their keep if the government withdrew its
support.
Max Weber suggested that it is the professional obligation of social
scientists to produce such inconvenient facts, indeed to produce facts that
embarrass all partisan points of view. We can advance the point in a way
Weber would have found perfectly congenial. Not just individual facts,
but whole theories of the way the world works, may be wrong in ways
that make nonsense of certain policy positions. This possibility offers the
critical strategy that Cervantes executes so brilliantly in Doze Quixote. The
poor Knight of the Sorrowful Countenance sets out with a vision of chiv-
alry that demands damsels in distress, villains, and the like. But those
figures appear nowhere in his social world, so his quest is doomed to
failure-even if he perseveres in seeing garlic-stinking Dulcinea as a
damsel. So some projects, including some policy positions, may be quixotic.
I want now to sketch an argument of this sort against what I shall
call the market model of medical services. I choose that model not, surely,
because it is the only one around open to fundamental criticism, but
because it happens to command a great deal of public rhetoric and the
political agenda right now, in ways that strike me as pernicious.
A pure market model might run this way: Health care is another
commodity to be bought and sold by freely consenting adults in an open
market. Some individuals get sick, some do not; some individuals sell
health care, some do not. Individual practitioners put their services up
for sale; consumers can buy or sell as they see fit; good practitioners will
be rewarded, bad ones penalized. Government meddling in this market
is an intrusion on the market liberties of patients and doctors alike. In its
pure form, this view commands the allegiance of a relatively small group
of libertarians. But impure forms of the same model are much more
common. Someone may add that we need to ensure a &dquo;decent mini-
mum&dquo;, or that consumers may not be as rational as their neoclassical
economic portrait suggests. Basically, however, the market model still
drives the analysis-not just the bare factual claims, but the policy ar-
guments about what is worth doing and what is not. We are all familiar
with the contrast between smoothly humming markets and tiresomely
inefficient bureaucracies.
The market model is wrong, though. It is a bad depiction of the
world, both the world as it exists and any imaginable alternatives we
now face. As a result, the market model leads to skewed policy formu-
lations, formulations that can be criticized effectively by undercutting the
descriptive plausibility of the model. We can discern no fewer than seven
points of strain, seven ways in which the market model misdescribes the
world.
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I have already noted the first. To call something a commodity is to
say that we think of it as something to be freely bought and sold, and
we attach no moral significance to the decisions people make about whether
and when to buy and sell it. That something is properly seen as a com-
modity can always be questioned: Marx sets out to indict political econ-
omists for casting labor as just another commodity, and worries that the
rest of us share that distorted view. But no such ambitious critique is
needed here. As a matter of fact, we do not think of health care as just
another commodity, which is the sort of observation a detached moral
anthropologist might report after observing our society. Instead, we think
it raises issues of need and justice. The market model thus misdescribes
the deeply held views we have of just what sort of thing health care is.
(Daniels [1985, chapter 2] and Walzer [1983, pp. 86-91] both attempt to
explain how health care is special. Daniels wants to link health care needs
to normal species functioning, Walzer to a sphere of communal provision,
but both authors decisively reject the market model.)
Second, the medical market, as Kenneth Arrow (1963) has argued,
is an anomalous market indeed, one destined to curious market failures.
For instance, there is enormously lopsided knowledge. The &dquo;consumer&dquo;
knows or suspects that something is wrong with him. The doctor tells
the patient what that is and what ought to be done about it. The patient,
however, is in,no position to judge the merits of the diagnosis or prog-
nosis, and may well feel that getting a second opinion increases his help-
lessness. Bernard Shaw mordantly noted the implications: &dquo;That any sane
nation, having observed that you could provide for the supply of bread
by giving bakers a pecuniary interest in baking for you, should go on to
give a surgeon a pecuniary interest in cutting off your leg, is enough to
make one despair of political humanity&dquo; (Shaw 1975, vol. 3, p. 226).
5haws point is not of course that all doctors are fiends, or that all
disease is iatrogenic, even if some left-wing critics of modem medicine
talk that way. (For example, see Illich 1976.) Rather, the point is that the
medical market has what game theorists might call a strategic structure,
which makes it a game of mixed conflict and cooperation with great
uncertainty. This third point underlines the significance of the asymmetry
of knowledge in the medical market. We find the expected putative so-
lotions to the troubling problems raised by 5haws point. So the Hippo-
cratic oath could be taken as an attempt to establish a norm in the medical
community that precludes doctors from generating a demand for their
own services. And the viability of malpractice suits can be taken as a
sanction ensuring compliance to the norm. Ironically, though, the extraor-
dinary sums of cash routinely awarded in malpractice suits, even if de-
served, have driven up malpractice insurance premiums so high that that
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expense creates a new incentive to find disease where it may not exist-
and, less dramatically but more ordinarily, to do all sorts of testing as a
precaution.
Once we note the key role incentives play in structuring the rational
behavior of doctors and patients, we may be tempted to juggle the in-
centives to improve matters. So Shaw, complacently fond of the state as
~ 
ever, was sure that socializing medicine would give physicians incentives
to keep people healthy. Our more recent fascination with vouchers and
Health Maintenance Organizations is very much in the same line, how-
ever different it is politically. Here we find an epicycle on the market
model: If the world does not run the way economic theory says it should,
let us restructure the world so that it does. I assume that is the source of
the appeal of Alain Enthovens voucher plan (Enthoven 1980a, b), or the
abortive federal drive of the 1970s to promote HMOs. Many things might
be said about the viability of this strategy, but the bottom line seems
clear: this is a case of many a slip ’twixt cup and lip. HMOs are supposed
to create incentives to keep people healthy, but they also create incentives
to underserve the needy and drive out the chronically ill. In the 1970s
according to Lawrence Brown (1983, pp. 139-40), &dquo;In certain California
plans, set up mainly to serve Medicaid recipients, officials attempted to
do just that, by refusing to answer emergency room phones, keeping
patients waiting for appointments until they gave up and went to local
hospitals’ outpatient or emergency departments (which the plan then re-
fused to reimburse), by administering tranquilizers to make patients feel
better in spite of physical problems, and by several other infamous ex-
pedients.&dquo; (Browns study might be taken. as a model of showing how
certain policy analyses offer distorted accounts of the world, and fail as
policy as a result.)
The fourth point follows naturally from thinking about strategic in-
teraction and asymmetric knowledge. Though the market model does not
mention it, relations between doctors and patients are inevitably power
relations. Again, authority in this context is here to stay and seems jus-
tifiable. But it sharply distinguishes health care from ordinary market
transactions, officially between free and equal agents. Just as Adam Smith
and Karl Marx both argued that it is implausible to view the labor market
as featuring voluntary transactions, since ivorkers have no choice but to
work and cannot outlast their wealthy employers in a showdown, so it
is implausible to view a transaction between doctor and patient as simply
a voluntary transaction between free and equal agents. Paul Starr has
insisted on the institutional implications of what he calls professional
sovereignty; the point is equally decisive in thinking about interactions
between individual doctors and patients. Michel Foucault has offered a
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striking account of the exercise of power in clinical settings, where naked
bodies are put under the dispassionate gaze of authorities (Foucault 1975;
1980, chapters 5-9). The account is overblown; nonetheless it is useful as
a corrective to the market model.
The fifth point argues against the easy contrast between market
,productivity and the stifling dead hand of government regulation. If we
do not insist on seeing the world through the lens provided by the model,
we will notice that the government has played an enabling role in
twentieth-century American health care. Hill-Burton and the National
Institutes of Health undeniably have contributed to the development of
the American health care industry. Underlying the market model here is
a misleading account of power and market. An unfortunate linchpin of
liberal social theory, from Bentham to Tocqueville, Hayek to Nozick, is
the view that rules (and so laws) limit our options. Some rules, though,
function as do the rules of grammar: following them enlarges our options.
No one can intelligibly complain that following the rules of grammar
limits one’s options by preventing one from uttering prepatterned noises;
. 
speaking language vastly multiplies our options. Similarly, some health
legislation has multiplied the options of practitioners and patients alike.
The sixth point is a rejoinder to the individualistic focus of the
market model. The model pictures individual consumer-patients shop-
ping around, and individual doctors offering their services. But the prac-
tice of health care in twentieth-century America is increasingly corporate.
Those demanding health care are firms and the government, who speak
for enormous groups of patients. Those supplying it are hospitals, Kaiser-
style health plans, and the like. So instead of the market models vast
number of anonymous individuals, none of whom can significantly affect
market conditions, a few huge players dominate the market. We are closer
to monopoly and monopsony than we are to a perfectly competitive market.
The seventh and final point is the most crucial, if the most abstract,
and again focuses on the individualism of the market model. In the model,
some people happen to get sick, others do not. That sort of individualism
has been a staple of American political thought for a long time: Not only
have we Americans justly congratulated ourselves on not having the rel-
atively immovable and visible class structure of European societies, we
have foolishly flattered ourselves by thinking that we have no class struc-
ture at all. Yet that piece of folk wisdom is utterly dubious. We know that
class, race, and ethnicity are tremendously important in the formation of
life chances in America. Just as being bom the son of J. Paul Getty in-
creases ones chances of ending up wealthy, so being bom in an inner-
city ghetto increases ones chances of contracting some diseases and de-
creases ones chances of getting help for them. The social distribution of
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health and disease, of therapy and neglect, makes a mockery of the market
model’s focus on solitary individuals who make their own choices. We do
of course make choices, but always against a background defined by
sociological factors that we have not chosen at all. Just as the explanatory
(pseudo?) question, &dquo;Why is there no socialism in America?&dquo; has tanta-
lized generations of labor historians, so the question, &dquo;Why is there no
national health insurance or national health service in America?&dquo; engages
some working in health policy. The answer simply cannot be American
distrust of the state. Historically, that distrust has coexisted quite peace-
fully with almost boundless faith in the state, at least in some junctures.
The deeper and more interesting answer, I suggest, lies in our intuitive
methodological individualism. That individualism makes it easier to cast
socialized health services of any form as a bizarre intrusion in the dealings
of free individuals.
That health care is needed, that it is dispensed by doctors with
superior shares of knowledge and power in settings marked by quirky
incentives, that government intrusion may increase human choice, that
the medical market is dominated by corporate actors, that disease is so-
cially distributed: all these factors argue against the market model’s
descriptive plausibility. Insofar as they do that, they make policy
recommendations based on the market model suspect. Nothing I have
said here precludes the possibility that markets are still a better way of
providing health care than a national health service or other alternatives.
But given the considerable gaps between the world pictured by the mar-
ket and the real world, any responsible case for the market will have to
be tentative. The only way to be fully enthusiastic about a market in
health care is to mistake the market model for reality. We need models,
of course, if we are to understand the world at all. But we do not need
to cling to oversimplified models that do ideological work. Todays cham-
pions of the market in health care are valiant but pathetic Quixotes, tilting
at windmills. At the moment, they seem not to have even a Sancho Panza
to look after them. Worse yet, they happen to be in charge.
CONFLICTS, MUDDLES, AND THE
WORLD OF POLICY DEBATE
I have been endorsing ambiguity and conflict, and skeptically as-
saulting drives to enshrine shining principles for what should happen,
or simple theories of what does. Some may indignantly respond that this
is a rationale for leaving ourselves hopelessly muddled, and that surely
the point of theory is to illuminate the world. My response, predictably,
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would run this way: there are muddles and muddles, some inarticulate
and confused, some nuanced and precise. If anything is to be made of
policy as the science of muddling through, we need to replace our baffled
and inarticulate muddles-and our neatly precise but false accounts-
with more precise and accurate ones. If we want to learn how &dquo;to strive
for imperfection&dquo; (Gutmann 1983, p. 66), we need to confront moral con-
flicts and to correct our images of how the world works. Finding a rea-
sonable health policy, if there is one, will depend on getting our &dquo;values&dquo;
and &dquo;facts&dquo; straighter than they now are.
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